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Abstract
This paper develops a general methodology for measuring value added of institu-
tions of higher education using commonly-available administrative data. Our approach
recognizes the data limitations and selection problems inherent in higher education, and
highlights the challenges these issues pose for education policy. Combining information
from different administrative sources in the state of Texas, we follow the universe of
Texas college applicants from the time of application (pre-enrollment) through public
college and into the labor market. In specifications that do not control for selection, we
find we find large, significant differences across colleges in terms of persistence, gradu-
ation, and earnings; however, these differences decrease substantially when we control
for selection. In light of the growing interest in using value-added measures in higher
education for both funding and incentivizing purposes, our methodology offers unique
evidence and lessons for policy makers.
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“Student achievement, which is inextricably connected to institutional suc-
cess, must be measured by institutions on a ‘value-added’ basis that takes into
account students’ academic baseline when assessing their results. This informa-
tion should be made available to students, and reported publicly in aggregate
form to provide consumers and policymakers an accessible, understandable way
to measure the relative effectiveness of different colleges and universities.”
Quote from “A Test of Leadership,” the 2006 Report of the U.S. Department of
Education (the Spellings Commission) on Higher Education
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen mounting pressure on colleges and universities to measure and dissem-
inate the value that they are adding to their students (Harnisch, 2011). This outcomes-based
culture recognizes foremost the need for measures of value-added that capture the causal in-
fluence of institutions on their students, taking into account the fact that students enter
college with different academic backgrounds (Spellings, 2006). Despite the fact that many
government agencies - both states in the U.S. and other countries - are using or are con-
sidering using quantitative measures of institutional performance to incentivize achievement
and target funding, there is little research that can guide policymakers towards an optimal
policy.
In this paper, we discuss the unique challenges of measuring value-added in higher edu-
cation and explore the possibilities and limitations of using commonly available student-level
administrative data as the basis for such measures. It proves useful to contrast the higher
education environment with that of primary and secondary education, a sector which is
broadly characterized by the use of yearly standardized test scores as the basis of value-
added measures. While there is evidence that such test-based value-added measures can
indeed capture differential performance of institutions and teachers (Kain and Staiger, 2008;
Klein, Kuh, Chun, Hamilton, and Shavelson, 2005), several differences render the wholesale
importation of the K-12 model to higher education impractical.
First, year-on-year standardized tests are not generally administered in higher educa-
tion.1 In their stead, we must consider other quantitative outcomes of the higher education
process that are available in administrative data bases. Three such outcomes of interest are
persistence rates, graduation rates, and post-college earnings.
Second, these available non-test outcomes are either only observed once (persistence or
graduation) or only observed post-enrollment (earnings). As such, we can not use a within-
1Some standardized tests in higher-education do exist, for example the Collegiate Learning Assessment
(CLA) test of general knowledge or the GRE Subject Tests of major specific knowledge; however, they are
not to our knowledge administered regularly to students in an administrative unit (e.g., a state or country).
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individual differencing estimator - an estimator which can be extremely useful in order to
isolate the influence of specific factors in the education process, such as teachers and schools,
separately from pre-existing student ability.2
Third, students deliberately and systematically select into colleges.3 Combined with
the lack of pre-enrollment outcome measures, this selection problem makes it difficult to
attribute student outcomes to the effect of the college attended separately from the effect of
pre-existing characteristics such as motivation and natural ability.
Fourth, college students intentionally specialize their instruction, and institutions em-
phasize discipline specific knowledge (i.e., major specific knowledge). Such specialization
calls for outcome measures that are comparable across students with a wide range of learned
abilities. In this respect, standardized tests of general skills may not be the optimal outcome
measure.
Reflecting the unique context of higher education and the availability of data, we pro-
pose a simple methodology that provides estimates of the relative value-added of individual
institutions: a student-level regression that explains the variation in the outcome of interest
through (i) observable differences in pre-enrollment student characteristics, (ii) unobserved
differences in student’s preferences for schools and school’s preferences for students, cap-
tured by a student’s application and acceptance profile, and (iii) fixed effects for the college
at which a student is enrolled. This model yields average differences in conditional outcomes
across colleges, or relative value-added measures; and these measures can be considered
causal value-added estimates to the extent that the observed and unobserved pre-enrollment
student characteristics control for differential selection into colleges.
We implement this methodology using rich administrative records from the state of Texas,
developing value-added estimates for the state’s 30 traditional four-year public colleges.
Texas has one of the most-developed K-20 data systems in the nation and thus provides
an ideal setting to demonstrate the incremental benefits of using various student-level data
sources to correct for selection, while at the same time demonstrating the potential bias that
can result by not correcting for selection.
Our analysis shows that there are large mean differences in outcomes across public colleges
prior to controlling for pre-existing student characteristics. For example, the unconditional
mean difference in earnings between Texas A&M University and Texas Southern Univer-
sity—the institutions with the highest and lowest unconditional earnings, respectively—is 78
2Certain populations do have labor market experience prior to college enrollment, facilitating student
fixed-effect models in labor market earnings. For example, Cellini and Chaudhary (2012) study the returns to
private, two-year colleges, and Arcidiacono, Cooley, and Hussey (2008) study the returns to MBA programs.
3Sorting undoubtedly occurs in the primary and secondary setting as well (Tiebout, 1956); presumably,
however, to a much smaller degree.
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log points. Perhaps not surprisingly, our analysis confirms that value-added measures change
considerably as pre-enrollment student characteristics are controlled for. Upon controlling
for the largest set of student characteristics and their unique application and acceptance
profile, the difference in mean earnings between Texas A&M and Texas Southern decreases
to 30 log points. A similar pattern is seen when using persistence and graduation as out-
comes, and when comparing amongst various student subgroups. We also find large variance
in value-added measures over time.
Our work relates to several different literatures. Several studies have used standardized
test scores to estimate value-added in higher education for select groups of students and
schools. For example, Klein, Kuh, Chun, Hamilton, and Shavelson (2005) administered a test
of cognitive skills to a small sample of students from diverse colleges in an effort to validate
the usefulness of such tests; Liu (2011) compares the results of two different methodologies
that measuring value-added of institutions using standardized test scores; and Saavedra
and Saavedra (2011) use standardized tests administered to a sample of Colombian college
students to estimate the value-added of a college education.
When the outcome in question is earnings, we study the same question as in the literature
on the labor market return to college quality (see e.g., Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman,
1996; Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg, 1999; Black and Smith, 2004; Zhang, 2009; Andrews, Li,
and Lovenheim, 2012). While this literature is mostly concerned with addressing selection
into college, our work is unique in estimating returns for individual schools, rather than using
an index of college quality or selectivity (such as the school average SAT score).
Furthermore, our work also provides a practical application of the Dale and Krueger
(2002) methodology - that controlling for the set of applications and acceptances can help
account for unobserved selection into schools - and we show how value-added estimates differ
with and without using applications and acceptances as controls. Another recent example
of the use of this methodology is Broecke (2012), who estimates returns to college selectivity
for students in the United Kingdom.
This work is also related to a strand of literature that uses natural experiments which
provide a locally exogenous selection rule into college to overcome the selection problem.
For example, Hoekstra (2009) exploits a strict SAT score cutoff used for admission by a
large flagship university to compare the earnings of applicants scoring just above and below
the admission cutoff while Saavedra (2009) exploits a sharp discontinuity in acceptance
based on a standardized college entry test in Colombia to measure the effect of attending
a better quality school on college exit scores, employment, and earnings. While attractive,
discontinuities of this type are rare, reducing the usefulness of this methodology for policy
making purposes.
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This paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss in Section 2 the value of higher education
and potential quantitative indicators of value in this setting. In Section 3, we discuss the
empirical challenges in the measurement of value-added in higher education, and outline our
empirical model. Section 4 describes the context of our empirical sample and the data we
use. Section 5 presents results of the analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Defining value in higher education
2.1 Defining the value of higher education to students
Colleges aim to produce a wide range of benefits for students. Perhaps foremost, colleges
aim to increase students’ individual utility: A college education imparts knowledge and
skills which increase students’ economic productivity and hence their wages, and higher
wages allow for an expanded budget set of consumption-leisure bundles.
Colleges also foster non-pecuniary benefits, such as offering greater choices in the type
of work one performs, an improved ability to make informed life decisions about marriage,
health, and parenting, and even perhaps an increased sense of general happiness (Oreopoulos
and Salvanes, 2011). Furthermore, knowledge in and of itself may have utility value for some
- the “consumption value” of knowledge.
Finally, colleges foster positive externalities accruing to society at large, benefits which
students will enjoy throughout their lives. These externalities operate through increasing
returns to knowledge, returns which are increasing in the proximity of other knowledgable
people, such as in firms (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001) or cities (Moretti, 2004). Similarly,
well informed, knowledgeable citizens are more likely to contribute to public goods that
improve the functioning of civic society, through acts such as voting and supporting free
speech (Dee, 2004).
These wide ranging goals of higher education suggest a role for multi-dimensional perfor-
mance measures. Our goal in this paper is not to suggest the particular outcome measures
that should be used to measure value-added in college; rather, we argue that a full appraisal
of institutional performance at the postsecondary level likely requires a set of indicators that
proxy for the various dimensions of institutional performance, and this set of indicators is
necessarily limited by data availability.
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2.2 Student level outcomes to measure institutional performance
In this light, we summarize potential student-level outcomes that could be used to measure
dimensions of institutional performance, noting both their advantages and disadvantages as
well as their availability in common administrative databases.
Standardized Tests
Test scores are a succinct and practical way to assess knowledge; compared year-to-year,
they provide a useful measure of knowledge gains. Indeed, standardized tests have been
developed to measure both general and specific knowledge in higher education. Tests of
general knowledge in higher education include, amongst others, the Collegiate Learning
Assessment (CLA), ACT’s Collegiate Assessment of Academic Proficiency (CAPP), and
ETS’s Measure of Academic Proficiency and Progress (MAPP). Examples of tests of specific
knowledge include ETS’s Major Specific Tests and GRE subject tests for certain disciplines.
Aside from certain licensure exams, such as for accountants or nurses, neither general nor
specific tests are currently applied to a student body in the U.S. as general practice.
While the use of these tests in the future as a basis for measuring value-added is appealing,
one issue that will likely complicate their use is that many students drop out of college, and
differential attrition across schools could make it difficult to use school average test scores
of general skills in a meaningful way. A separate issue is that it is unclear how to compare
gains in knowledge across disciplines.
GPA
GPA, or individual course grades, are a natural consideration as an outcome of student
performance, and they are generally included in administrative databases. However, grades
are commonly normalized within a class to a predetermined distribution; as such, it is difficult
to compare them within schools (specifically, across majors) or across schools. For example,
consider comparing “A” in Calculus at two different colleges, when it is known that one
teaches a more rigorous Calculus course.
Graduation and Persistence
Whether a student persists through college and ultimately graduates is certainly of interest
to policy makers. One appeal of graduation rates as an indicator of the value obtained
in college is that the degree granting process standardizes to some extent the knowledge
and skill levels deemed necessary to receive that degree. What is unclear, however, is the
extent to which obtaining a college degree informs us of the quality of the knowledge and
skills the student acquired while in school. Nonetheless, graduation and persistence data is
commonly available in administrative databases, and in fact completion rates are currently
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incorporated in several U.S. states performance based funding models (Midwestern Higher
Education Compact, 2009).
One limitation of graduation rates is that they are observed many years after a student
initially enrolls in school, which introduces a long time-lag between any changes in policy
and the observation of that policy’s effect. Naturally, one-year persistence rates overcome
this limitation and allow for more immediate policy feedback.
Wages / Earnings
Wages are an attractive measure of achievement in college for two reasons. First, a simple
theory of competitive labor markets predicts that the wage rate equals a worker’s marginal
product: The more a worker adds to the value of a final product, the higher her wage will
be. Higher wages signal high productivity, and productivity is increased through knowledge
and skills, which can be learned in college.
Second, unlike tests, the wage rate aggregates the influence of both general and specific
skills in accordance with their importance for economic productivity. For example, a nurse’s
wage reflect general and specific skills, say communication skills and wound care skills, while
a civil engineers’s wage reflects her general and specific skills, say problem-solving and design
skills. Therefore, in a perfectly competitive labor market, any two workers with the same
wage are equally productive despite having different occupations.
Labor markets, however, may not be perfectly competitive, and the wage rate becomes
less attractive as a measure of value to the extent that market frictions exist. For example,
unionized occupations may receive wages in excess of their productivity. Furthermore, several
other disadvantages of wages as a measure of the value of education can be identified: if
workers are intrinsically motivated, as is often the case in the non-profit sector, then wages
do not fully reflect productivity; wages are only observed for those who work which excludes,
for example, home care; and the social benefits of education such as civic-mindedness are
likely not reflected in wages.
In addition, we typically do not observe wage rates in administrative databases, but
rather, earnings over some time period (a quarter or year). Earnings are less attractive than
wages as they combine both the wage rate and the labor supply decision. Several other
disadvantages of the use of earnings are of note. First, earnings data that can be matched at
the individual level to educational databases usually come from state unemployment records
which only include earnings only from jobs that are eligible for unemployment insurance
(UI) benefits. These include the majority of earnings from wages and salaries but exclude
other sources, such as self-employment income. UI records also exclude earnings from federal
government jobs, including those in the military. UI earnings thus systematically underreport
total earnings, and this is a concern if students who attend some institutions are more likely
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to generate earnings from uncovered sources than are students who attend other institutions.
Second, any state-level earnings database only contains earnings information for jobs
held within the state, implying that we can only use such databases to track the earnings of
college students who maintain residence in the state. This is a concern if there is differential
out-of-state migration of students across colleges and students who are employed out-of-state
have systematically higher or lower earnings than those employed in-state. Finally, as with
graduation rates, there is a long time lag between enrollment in college and the observation
of labor market earnings (usually after graduation).
3 Measuring value-added in higher education
Consider a generic educational production function that could be used to estimate differences
in student outcomes across schools when the outcome of interest is observed pre-enrollment:
Yis = dYi,PRE + FXi,PRE +
nX
s=1
bsEs + eis (1)
Es are a set of indicators for enrollment at various colleges s, Yis is an outcome for student
i who attended school s, Yi,PRE is the pre-enrollment value of the outcome measure, and
Xi,PRE is a vector of observable pre-enrollment student characteristics. It would be conve-
nient if the coefficients bs were interpretable as the school-average, over-time change in the
outcome that is attributable to the effect of attending the school in question. However, such
a causal interpretation can be confounded for several reasons.
First, students may select into colleges in ways that are both unobservable to the analyst
and correlated with the outcome of interest, even conditional on Yi,PRE and Xi,PRE. For
example, students likely have private knowledge about their future career goals that is not
reflected in their observable actions when applying to schools, and they likely select colleges
that best advance those career goals. Indeed, this type of self selection into colleges is actively
encouraged by guidance counselors, teachers, and parents alike.
Second, pre-college outcome measures, Yi,PRE, are often not observed (as is often the case
with standardized test scores or earnings) or do not exist (as with indicators of persistence
and graduation). Thus, we are forced to estimate:
Yis = FXi,PRE +
nX
s=1
bsEs + eis (2)
and we must rely solely on Xi,PRE to capture unobserved selection effects that may be
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correlated with outcomes and school choice. Furthermore, the lack of pre-enrollment outcome
measures implies that bs in equation (2) reflects the relative differences in outcomes across
schools (as opposed to within school changes over time).4
Third, the outcome of interest may not be observed for all students. For example, students
may be absent on the day of a standardized test; earnings may not be observed if a student
moves out of the state in which they attended school; or students may transfer to different
colleges not covered by the database at hand. Differential observability of outcomes may
bias estimates of bs.
Thus, barring pre-enrollment data on the outcome of interest, a causal interpretation of
bs relies on both Xi,PRE adequately controlling for selection into colleges and ensuring that
outcomes are observed for all enrollees. In practice, we argue that Xi,PRE should include all
observable characteristics available to the researcher that influence the choice of college and
the outcome of interest. Typical characteristics available in administrative datasets include
gender, ethnicity, high school course achievement (courses and grades), and standardized
test scores (e.g., SAT scores).
Certainly, some observable variables available to the researcher have been affected by the
student’s choice of college; for example, the choice of major or participation in sports or
activities. If such variables are included in Xi,PRE, estimates of bs would exclude the direct
effect of these variables on the outcome of interest. It may certainly be of interest to estimate
models conditioning on post-enrollment choices (such as one’s major), but such a model will
not yield the comprehensive value-added of colleges. Thus, variables that could be affected
by college choice should rightfully be considered as outcomes rather than covariates.
Controlling for selection on observables
One set of conditioning variables deserves particular discussion: the set of schools to which
a student applied and was accepted. Dale and Krueger (2002) argue that conditioning
on this profile of applications and acceptances captures information about the selection
process that would otherwise be unobserved by the researcher. Specifically, they argue that
students use private information to optimize their college application decisions, and colleges
use information unobservable to researchers (such as the quality of written statements and
letters of recommendation) to make acceptance decisions. Thus, students with identical
college application and acceptance profiles are likely to be similar on both observable and
unobservable dimensions.
4An alternative specification that included high school graduates who never attended college would recover
the absolute effects of attending a particular college (over not attending college); however, this specification
is only available for outcomes that are observed even if one does not attend college, such as earnings.
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Of course, even controlling for application and acceptance profiles is unlikely to perfectly
describe selection into college. In particular, this identification strategy essentially compares
students with the same observable characteristics who applied to and were accepted at the
same set of colleges, yet decided to attend different colleges. It would be naïve to believe
that this ultimate choice of which school to attend was uncorrelated with the outcomes of
interest.
4 Data and Sample
4.1 Higher Education in Texas
We demonstrate the applicability of this value-added model using rich administrative data
from the state of Texas that tracks students from high school, through college, and into the
labor force. For at least two reasons, Texas is an excellent setting to estimate these models.
First, it is a large and diverse state that closely mirrors the demographic and socio-economic
make-up of the U.S. population. Second, the vast majority of Texans attend college in state;
for example, 88 percent of Texas high school graduates who enrolled at a four-year college
in 2002 enrolled at a Texas public college (Snyder, Dillow, and Hoffman, 2007). This second
characteristic helps mitigate sample selection issues that would likely be far more problematic
in a smaller state where students tend to migrate out of state either for college or to work
after graduating.
Our analysis focuses on the 30 traditional public four-year universities in the state dur-
ing our sample period, which includes the entering first-year cohorts of the 1998 to 2002
academic years.5,6 These traditional four-year universities can be grouped into three main
categories: flagship institutions, emerging research institutions with statewide draw, and
regionally focused institutions.
The two flagship institutions, the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M Uni-
versity at College Station, are nationally recognized PhD-granting research institutions that
offer a comprehensive set of majors and draw a diverse range of students from across the
state and nation. The six emerging research institutions are major PhD-granting institutions
5We do not include five non-traditional four-year public universities (Sul Ross University Rio Grande
College, University of Houston-Clear Lake, University of Houston-Victoria, University of North Texas Dal-
las, and Texas A&M Texarkana) and one university that opened in the middle of our sample period (UT
Brownsville).
6Due to a lack of data, we do not consider private colleges nor two-year colleges, although in principle
the methodology we propose can be equally applied to any class of institutions.
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that draw their students mainly from within the state and also offer a comprehensive set of
majors. These include Texas Tech University, University of Texas at Arlington, University
of Texas at San Antonio, University of Texas at El Paso, University of Texas at Dallas,
University of Houston, and University of North Texas. The remaining 22 public four-year
institutions generally do grant PhDs, but they vary in major and course offerings and tend
to attract students from within their geographical region. Appendix Table A.1 lists all of
the schools included in our analysis and summarizes several additional institutional details.
4.2 Data
Our data comes from various administrative agencies in Texas, and is housed securely by
the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB). THECB collects information on
all individuals who apply to or attend any college in the state, including indicators of which
school(s) a student applied to and whether or not she was accepted, the number of credit
hours a student was enrolled for each semester, and whether or not she graduated.
To this collegiate database, we merge three other data sources at the individual level
using students’ Social Security Numbers (SSN). Data on Texas Public high school graduates
is provided by the Texas Education Agency (TEA), which includes courses taken, programs
participated in, an indicator of belonging to a low-income family (eligibility for free school
lunch), an indicator for being at risk of not graduating7, and the students’ gender and
race/ethnicity. SAT test score data is purchased from the College Board as is survey data
collected at the time of the test, which includes self-reported GPA, class rank, planned ed-
ucational attainment, and father’s and mother’s education level. Finally, quarterly earnings
data comes from the state’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits program, which is avail-
able for all workers employed in benefits-eligible jobs in the state.8 While some employment
in Texas is excluded from the Texas UI database (e.g., the self-employed, certain exempt
occupations), there is evidence that the vast majority of employment is included (for details
see Stevens (2002)).
7The indicator for being at risk of not graduating takes a value of one if a student has any of a set of
characteristics identified by the TEA as predicting drop-out; examples include failing at least two courses
in the basic high school curriculum, being retained within grade, being pregnant or a parent, having been
expelled, or being on parole. For a comprehensive list characteristics that define the at risk indicator, see
the TEA data standards at http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/trex/datastds/
8The unemployment insurance records in Texas - as well as many other states - also indicate the industry
of the employer in each job held by an individual worker. Unfortunately, this information is not particularly
useful for our purposes as it is impossible to distinguish between occupations within an industry (for example,
accountants, engineers, and custodians are not distinguishable within the oil industry).
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Outcome variables
Using this data, we define several outcome variables. A student is defined as graduating
from college she if receives a bachelor’s degree at any public or private four-year college in
Texas by the end of the sixth academic year after graduating from high school. Similarly,
we define a student as persisting into year two of college if she completes at least 30 credit
hours at any public or private four-year college in Texas by the end of the sixth academic
year after graduating from high school.
Note that these definitions allows for transfers within the Texas public school system,
yet attribute the effect of graduating/persisting to the school of initial enrollment (as long
as that initial enrollment was at a public four-year college). This choice of definitions is
consistent with the principle espoused previously that any outcome subsequent to initial
enrollment is rightfully attributable to the effect first school attended.
Furthermore, note that the choice of time horizon for persistence and degree completion
involves a tradeoff: a short horizon will exclude students with longer-than-normal college
careers, while a long horizon introduces a large lag between the action of institutions and
the measurement of student response (i.e., graduating), thus reducing the utility of value-
added measures for policy making purposes. While a six year completion window is consistent
with much of the academic literature, policy makers must necessarily weigh these competing
demands in light of the context at hand.
Annual earnings, converted to 2010 dollars using the CPI-U, are calculated as the sum
of quarterly earnings reported to the state in the eighth calendar year after graduating from
high school. As with graduation and persistence, this choice of time horizon involves a
tradeoff: on the one hand, a longer time horizon ensures that all students have had sufficient
time to complete college and be absorbed by the labor market; on the other, it also increases
the lag time between the actions of the institution and the measurement of the response.
An important limitation of using Unemployment Insurance earnings data is that we do not
observe earnings for students who migrate out-of-state, making it impossible to distinguish
between those individuals who do not work, are not working in a benefits-eligible job, or
have moved out of state. Importantly, this limitation is not specific to Texas, as no state
Unemployment Insurance commission tracks earnings across state lines. This issue of missing
data can be problematic for our proposed value-added methodology if there is a correlation
between choice of school and having zero UI earnings. Given this limitation, two options
are available: (i) impute missing UI data with zero earnings, or (ii) treat missing UI data
as missing when constructing our measure of earnings. We choose the latter approach,
although we note that the choice of approach is necessarily context specific and will dictate
the interpretability of resulting value-added estimates.
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4.3 Sample and summary statistics
Our empirical analysis uses data for students who graduated from any Texas public high
school between 1998 and 2002 and subsequently enrolled in a Texas public four-year college.
Note that this sample excludes enrollees from several groups for whom we do not have pre-
enrollment data: students that were home schooled, that attended a private high school in
Texas, or that attended any high school out of state.
Table 1 summarizes the data, for both the sample of all enrollees and only enrollees with
non-zero UI earnings. Looking first at the sample of all enrollees, annual earnings (amongst
those with reported earnings) average about $37,000 dollars, 60 percent graduate within six
years of enrolling, and 84 percent persist into the year two of college within six years of
enrolling. Note that we do not exclude students that are enrolled in graduate school, or
are still enrolled in an undergraduate degree. While it may be desirable to exclude these
students in certain contexts, we include them in keeping with the principle that the choice
of enrolling in graduate school or not graduating may be influenced by ones undergraduate
experience.
The majority of the sample (60 percent) is white, although there is a significant hispanic
population. Eighteen percent of the sample is low income, as indicated by their eligibility for
free lunch, about a third were at risk of not graduating high school, and the average composite
SAT score of 1042 points is, not surprisingly, close to the nation-wide average (The College
Board). The sample excluding enrollees with zero earnings is observably similar to the full
sample, reflecting the heterogenous composition of the zero-earnings sample which likely
includes both low- and high-skilled individuals.
Note that SAT data is missing for about 23 percent of the full sample, despite the fact
that all of the colleges in our sample required SAT scores for admission. It is likely that these
students incorrectly reported their SSN to the College Board, and we include an indicator
for missing SAT data in the regression analysis below.
Application and acceptance profiles
Table 2 contains the distribution of the number of applications students made to the 30
schools in our sample. The vast majority of students (63 percent) applied to only one school,
and very few students applied to more than three schools. In order to characterize the sets
of schools that students applied to and were accepted at, we create indicator variables as
follows. For students who applied to two or three schools, we create indicators for the unique
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combinations of applications and acceptances, yielding 2350 groups.9 For computational
feasibility, we create one indicator variable for students who applied to four or more schools.
Note that application and acceptance data provides no extra useful information for the
students who applied to only one school. Finally, for about five percent of students, we do
not observe an application to any school. This missing information is likely due to mis-
reporting of a student’s SSN (our matching variable) by colleges to the THECB, and we
include an indicator in regressions below for students with no application data.
5 Results
We present estimates of Equation 2 for three outcomes: persistence, graduation, and earn-
ings. For consistency, we exclude the indicator for enrollment at Texas A&M University in all
models (Texas A&M graduates have the highest unconditional earnings); thus, estimates of
 s are interpretable as mean differences in the outcome relative to Texas A&M, conditional
on the included covariates.
5.1 Outcome: Earnings
We begin by examining how conditional earnings change upon controlling for successively
more comprehensive sets of pre-college enrollment covariates. Table 3 displays  s from
various specifications of Equation 2 in which the outcome is the logarithm of earnings eight
years after graduating from high school. Column 1 conditions only on high-school graduation
year fixed effects, which absorb any aggregate differences in earnings across years, such as
the effect of inflation or general macroeconomic shocks. Thus, the coefficients in column
1 can be interpreted (up to an approximation) as the average percentage differences in
unconditional earnings of enrollees at various Texas colleges, relative to enrollees at Texas
A&M. For example, UT Dallas enrollees earned on average 12 percent less than Texas A&M
enrollees, while Texas Southern University enrollees earned on average about 118 percent less
9For students who applied to two schools, there are C302 ⇤3 = 1, 305 possible combinations of applications
and acceptances: for each of the C302 unique combinations of schools applied to, there are three possible
acceptance outcomes (accepted only at one school or the other, or accepted at both schools). Using a
similar logic, there are C303 ⇤ 6 = 24, 360 possible combinations of applications and acceptances for students
who applied to three schools. Amongst these 25,665 possible combinations, only 2,350 contain two or more
students, a result stemming largely from the fact that students in Texas tend to not apply to regional schools
outside of their home area.
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than Texas A&M enrollees.10 Perhaps not surprisingly, the relative differences in unadjusted
log earnings correlate highly with common perceptions of college “quality” published in the
popular press such as U.S. News & World Report or Barron’s Magazine.
Furthermore, note that all of the estimates in column 1 are significantly different from
zero at the one percent level; as such, we are fairly confident that average unconditional
earnings of students who initially enroll at Texas A&M are significantly higher than those of
students who initially enroll in any other four-year public institution in Texas. While this is
useful information, we are ultimately interested in all pair-wise tests of significance between
colleges. We return to discuss this issue below.
The results in column 1 serve as a base case that can be compared with models that
control for selection into colleges. Columns 2 through 5 sequentially add the following sets
of control variables: (i) race and gender controls, (ii) high school fixed effects and indicators
for courses taken during high school, (iii) SAT score and various student and family demo-
graphics collected by the College Board, and (iv) application group fixed effects. The order
of addition roughly reflects the likely availability of data in administrative databases: Race
and gender are likely available in any higher education database; high school information
requires coordination with the state K-12 education agency; SAT information must be pur-
chased from the College Board; college application data is increasingly common, but costly
to collect.
Our main interest is in how estimates of  s change upon controlling for various covariates.
Comparing across the columns of Table 3, several observations are worth noting. First, the
range of point estimates shrinks as more controls are added. For example, the absolute
range is 0.78 in column 1, 0.43 in column 3 and 0.27 in column 5. This trend could be
explained by students selecting into colleges according to innate ability (which leads to
higher earnings); for example, students with high innate ability are more likely to attend
Texas A&M, while students with relatively lower innate ability are more likely to attend
Texas Southern University. Therefore, controlling for these predetermined covariates that
are correlated with ability reduces the disparity in earnings across institutions perceived to
be of high or low quality, bringing the estimates closer to the true causal effects of attending
particular colleges.
Second, some sets of covariates change resulting estimates much more than others. For
example, moving from column 1 to column 2 - controlling for race and gender in addition
to year fixed effects - changes coefficients much less than moving from, say, column 2 to




Third, the model with the most comprehensive set of covariates currently available in
Texas stands out because many of the differences between Texas A&M and other universi-
ties become insignificant, as seen in Column 5; as such, we cannot statistically distinguish
differential value-added across schools in this model. While we do not believe that the model
in Column 5 has fully solved the omitted variable bias problem, it is likely that controlling
for any even more covariates that determine the selection process will reduce significant
differences even further.
5.2 Significant differences across colleges
While informative, Table 4 does not directly inform us of the difference in earnings between
all pair-wise combinations of institutions. One way to summarize this information is demon-
strated in Table 4, which contains a matrix of p-values from pair-wise tests of significance of
the coefficients in column 5 of Table 3, our preferred estimates that match students on their
college application and acceptance profiles.
The columns and rows in Table 4 are ordered as in Table 3, by order of the highest
conditional earnings from the fully specified model. Comparisons between all colleges are
now visible, and, for example, we cannot say with any degree of confidence that students
attending UT Permian Basin, a small regional college located in West Texas, earn less on
average than observationally equivalent students at any other college. However, this is due
to a large standard error that is partially a result of the relatively small number of students
attending UT Permian Basin.
5.3 Outcomes: Persistence and graduation rates
We now investigate one-year persistence rates and graduation rates as outcomes. In the
interest of brevity, we display in Table 5 only results from the model that includes the
largest set of covariates used in column 5 of Table 3; however, qualitatively similar patterns
as in Table 3 result from the successive addition of covariates with persistence and graduation
as outcomes. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 include all college enrollees, while columns 2 and
4 contain only enrollees with non-zero annual earnings (the same sample as used in the
preceding earnings models). For ease of comparison, we order colleges in Table 5 as in Table
3.
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Comparing across outcome measures
Focusing first on columns 1 and 3, it is obvious that the ranking of schools is different from
the ranking in the earnings regressions. For example, UT Tyler does relatively poorly in
conditional graduation rates (18 percentage points lower than Texas A&M), although it had
the highest conditional earnings in the state. On the other hand, UT El Paso for example
has the lowest conditional earnings and persistence rate amongst all public institutions in
Texas.
It is important to note that different outcomes (e.g. earnings versus graduation rates) cap-
ture different parts of the education production process and may lead to different value-added
rankings. Nevertheless, there is certainly a correlation between persistence and graduation,
in that one must persist to graduate, and there is likely a correlation between graduation
and earnings, in that years in college have a positive return in the labor market, at least
marginally.
Sensitivity to the choice of sample
The practical use of this value-added model requires several sample selection criteria; to
name a few, whether to include or exclude out-of-state enrollees in in-state colleges, students
in graduate school when earnings is the outcome, or students with missing pre-enrollment
covariates. Importantly, such sample selection criteria may influence resulting value-added
estimates.
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the choice of sample with one example salient to our
empirical context: whether or not to include students with zero earnings when using gradua-
tion and persistence as outcomes. There is no a priori reason why we would want to exclude
enrollees with missing earnings when considering graduation or persistence, but if we are
comparing estimates from persistence and graduation rate models to earnings models, it is
useful to use the same sample. This sensitivity can be seen by comparing column 1 with
column 2, and column 3 with column 4 in Table 5. In this case, there is little movement in
the point estimates across the samples. However, the general point remains that different
samples can lead to different value-added estimates.
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5.4 Heterogeneous effects
Table 6 presents value-added estimates by high school graduation cohort, using earnings as
an outcome. It is clear that is there is some movement across time in differential value-added.
For example, comparing conditional earnings of enrollees at UT Tyler across cohorts to the
same cohorts entering Texas A&M, they are the same in 1998, 44 log points higher in 1999,
and 24 log points lower in 2001. Other schools show less variation across years: for example,
observe the small range in the coefficients across time for Texas Tech University.
An important consequence of using year-specific models is that a smaller sample size will
likely result in larger standard errors compared to the pooled model, and the larger standard
errors will reducesour ability to statistically distinguish across schools.11 We include this
year-specific analysis to highlight an important challenge faced by policy makers interested
in using using value-added measures to incentivize short-term behavior. Specifically, pooling
across years reduces noise and increases precision, yet combines the effects of administrative
policies over several years.
6 Conclusions and recommendations
In this paper, we have discussed the issues surrounding the measurement of value-added in
higher education, and we proposed a general methodology for measuring the value-added of
individual institutions using existing administrative data. Our empirical exercise estimates
value added models for the state of Texas considering persistence rates, graduation rates, and
earnings as outcome measures. We demonstrate how the choice of both conditioning variables
and the base sample can influence value-added estimates, and we emphasize the importance
of statistically distinguishing value-added estimates between individual institutions.
Owing to the multi-dimensional objective function of higher education institutions, it is
unlikely that a single outcome measure will fully reflect institutional performance. Thus, we
have argued that a system of multiple metrics capturing various dimensions of institutional
performance is crucial to gain a full understanding of overall institutional performance.
We believe further research should consider the usefulness of optimally combining multiple
measures of college performance, perhaps along the lines recent work in the health care sector
(e.g., McClellan and Staiger 2000).
11A precise statistical comparison of over-time changes in value-added could be preformed by fully inter-
action all regressors in the model with year dummies or estimating the system of equations in a Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) model.
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Regardless of the outcome in question, the interest in value-added measures in part
stems from a desire amongst policy makers to incentivize performance, as is evidenced by
the current debate in many U.S. states. Importantly, our results suggest that policy makers
should use caution in applying value-added methods of the kind we estimate for incentivizing
purposes or otherwise tie them to pay or funding. We show that value-added measures change
significantly upon conditioning on successively more information about the pre-enrollment
characteristics of students, and we argue that even conditioning on the most complete set
of characteristics available is unlikely to yield value-added estimates that can be interpreted
causally. As such, improperly designed measures have as much potential to deceive as to
inform about true institutional quality.
We have also shown that adjusting outcomes for predetermined student characteristics
often makes it impossible to statistically distinguish across many sets of colleges. In general,
we urge policymakers to think in terms of broad classifications of institutional performance
as opposed to specific ordinal rankings. One possibility is to determine a benchmark (e.g., a
target graduation rate) and classify institutions relative to that benchmark (e.g., statistically
below, within normal statistical variance of, or exceeding the specified benchmark).
Finally, experience with value-added measures in the K-12 sector has shown that institu-
tions are likely to game the system (e.g., Figlio, 2006), and there is no reason to not expect
similar responses in higher education. For example, if funding is tied to conditional comple-
tion rates, institutions may lower grading standards in order to graduate more students or
admit students with unobserved attributes that make them more likely to graduate. Policy
must acknowledge and address such perverse incentives when developing and implementing
value-added measures for higher education.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of outcome variables and selected control variables.
Mean (s.d.) Obs. Mean (s.d.) Obs.
Outcomes
Annual/earnings,/$ 36,474 (41,910) 169,239 36,474 (41,910) 169,239
Graduated 0.60 (0.49) 217,733 0.61 (0.49) 169,239
Persisted/into/year/2/of/college 0.84 (0.37) 217,733 0.85 (0.36) 169,239
Student,demographics
Black 0.12 (0.33) 217,733 0.13 (0.34) 169,239
Hispanic 0.21 (0.41) 217,733 0.22 (0.42) 169,239
White 0.60 (0.49) 217,733 0.59 (0.49) 169,239
Other/race 0.06 (0.25) 217,733 0.06 (0.23) 169,239
Male 0.45 (0.50) 217,733 0.44 (0.50) 169,239
High,School,variables
Courses,and,programs
English/as/a/2nd/Language 0.13 (1.07) 217,733 0.13 (1.05) 169,239
GiNed/and/talented/program 0.38 (1.13) 217,733 0.37 (1.11) 169,239
Calculus 0.23 (0.44) 217,733 0.22 (0.43) 169,239
PreQCalculus 0.24 (0.43) 217,733 0.25 (0.43) 169,239
Algebra/2 0.07 (0.26) 217,733 0.07 (0.26) 169,239
Biology 0.02 (0.13) 217,733 0.02 (0.13) 169,239
Chemistry 0.02 (0.14) 217,733 0.02 (0.14) 169,239
Physics 0.05 (0.22) 217,733 0.05 (0.22) 169,239
Student,status
Eligible/for/free/lunch 0.18 (0.38) 217,733 0.18 (0.39) 169,239
At/risk/of/not/graduaRng 0.29 (1.11) 217,733 0.29 (1.09) 169,239
SAT


































Table 3: Earnings differences of enrollees at Texas four-year public colleges. Conditioning
on various subsets of observable covariates.
Outcome(=
UT#Tyler (0.24** (0.04) (0.23** (0.04) (0.15** (0.04) (0.13** (0.04) 0.01 (0.08)
Texas#Women's#U. (0.30** (0.03) (0.21** (0.03) (0.12** (0.03) (0.08** (0.03) 0.00 (0.05)
Texas#A&M#U. (( (( (( (( ((
Texas#Tech#U.# (0.18** (0.01) (0.18** (0.01) (0.07** (0.01) (0.05** (0.01) 0.00 (0.03)
S.#F.#AusEn#State#U. (0.28** (0.01) (0.25** (0.01) (0.16** (0.01) (0.12** (0.01) (0.01 (0.03)
Tarleton#State#U. (0.28** (0.02) (0.29** (0.02) (0.14** (0.02) (0.10** (0.02) (0.01 (0.05)
UT#Dallas (0.12** (0.02) (0.12** (0.02) (0.14** (0.02) (0.11** (0.02) (0.02 (0.05)
West#Texas#A&M#U. (0.33** (0.02) (0.32** (0.02) (0.13** (0.03) (0.09** (0.03) (0.03 (0.06)
U.#of#North#Texas (0.31** (0.01) (0.28** (0.01) (0.20** (0.01) (0.16** (0.01) (0.04 (0.03)
UT#Pan#American (0.52** (0.01) (0.47** (0.02) (0.19** (0.03) (0.14** (0.03) (0.04 (0.03)
TAMU#Galveston (0.21** (0.04) (0.21** (0.04) (0.17** (0.04) (0.13** (0.04) (0.04 (0.07)
TAMU#Commerce (0.36** (0.02) (0.33** (0.02) (0.25** (0.03) (0.20** (0.03) (0.05 (0.05)
Texas#State#U. (0.24** (0.01) (0.23** (0.01) (0.13** (0.01) (0.10** (0.01) (0.05 (0.03)
UT#AusEn (0.13** (0.01) (0.12** (0.01) (0.12** (0.01) (0.11** (0.01) (0.06** (0.02)
TAMU#Corpus#ChrisE (0.31** (0.02) (0.29** (0.02) (0.17** (0.02) (0.13** (0.02) (0.07 (0.04)
S.#Houston#State#U. (0.29** (0.02) (0.25** (0.02) (0.18** (0.02) (0.14** (0.02) (0.07* (0.03)
Lamar#U. (0.35** (0.02) (0.32** (0.02) (0.21** (0.03) (0.16** (0.03) (0.08 (0.04)
UT#Arlington (0.25** (0.02) (0.22** (0.02) (0.17** (0.02) (0.14** (0.02) (0.09* (0.04)
UT#Permian#Basin (0.30** (0.04) (0.28** (0.04) (0.13* (0.05) (0.08 (0.05) (0.11 (0.12)
U.#of#Houston (0.26** (0.01) (0.21** (0.01) (0.20** (0.01) (0.17** (0.01) (0.11** (0.03)
Prairie#View#A&M#U. (0.59** (0.02) (0.41** (0.02) (0.28** (0.02) (0.23** (0.02) (0.12** (0.04)
TAMU#Kingsville (0.50** (0.02) (0.46** (0.02) (0.23** (0.03) (0.18** (0.03) (0.12** (0.04)
Midwestern#State#U. (0.42** (0.02) (0.40** (0.02) (0.23** (0.03) (0.18** (0.03) (0.13** (0.05)
Angelo#State#U. (0.43** (0.02) (0.41** (0.02) (0.20** (0.02) (0.16** (0.02) (0.14** (0.04)
UT#San#Antonio (0.40** (0.01) (0.37** (0.01) (0.24** (0.02) (0.19** (0.02) (0.14** (0.03)
U.#of#Houston#Dwtn. (0.42** (0.02) (0.33** (0.02) (0.22** (0.02) (0.17** (0.02) (0.14** (0.04)
Sul#Ross#State#U. (0.48** (0.04) (0.45** (0.04) (0.19** (0.04) (0.14** (0.04) (0.15 (0.08)
TAMU#InternaEonal (0.41** (0.03) (0.36** (0.03) (0.26** (0.05) (0.20** (0.05) (0.18** (0.06)
Texas#Southern#U. (0.78** (0.02) (0.60** (0.02) (0.43** (0.03) (0.37** (0.03) (0.23** (0.05)
UT#El#Paso (0.63** (0.02) (0.58** (0.02) (0.40** (0.03) (0.35** (0.03) (0.27** (0.05)
Year#FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race#FE,#Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
H.S.#FE,#H.S.#demographics Yes Yes Yes
SAT#score,#SAT#demographics Yes Yes
ApplicaEon#group#FE Yes
ObservaEons 169,239 169,239 169,239 169,239 169,239
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Table 4: P-values from tests of significant differences between coefficients on college enroll-
























































































































































































































































UT#Tyler .99 .98 .80 .87 .80 .71 .53 .58 .63 .55 .47 .39 .35 .35 .30 .24 .41 .15 .11 .12 .11 .07 .06 .09 .16 .05 .01 .00
Texas#Women's#U. .99 .72 .84 .75 .65 .34 .44 .56 .43 .29 .19 .19 .17 .15 .09 .37 .03 .02 .03 .03 .01 .01 .02 .10 .01 .00 .00
Texas#A&M#U.
Texas#Tech#U.# .58 .81 .69 .58 .14 .25 .51 .32 .07 .02 .07 .04 .06 .01 .34 .00 .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00 .07 .00 .00 .00
S.#F.#Aus9n#State#U. .91 .98 .80 .38 .53 .68 .51 .26 .12 .17 .11 .13 .06 .42 .01 .00 .02 .02 .00 .00 .01 .11 .01 .00 .00
Tarleton#State#U. .91 .76 .48 .57 .66 .54 .39 .27 .26 .24 .21 .13 .42 .05 .03 .05 .05 .02 .01 .03 .12 .02 .00 .00
UT#Dallas .84 .57 .66 .73 .62 .48 .33 .32 .30 .26 .16 .45 .07 .04 .06 .06 .03 .01 .04 .15 .03 .00 .00
West#Texas#A&M#U. .84 .90 .89 .83 .76 .62 .55 .55 .48 .39 .54 .24 .17 .19 .16 .10 .09 .13 .23 .08 .01 .00
U.#of#North#Texas .89 ### .95 .84 .56 .50 .48 .41 .22 .58 .07 .04 .08 .08 .02 .00 .04 .21 .03 .00 .00
UT#Pan#American .95 .88 .74 .50 .44 .45 .38 .24 .55 .08 .05 .05 .08 .03 .00 .04 .20 .03 .00 .00
TAMU#Galveston .96 .92 .79 .70 .71 .62 .53 .62 .37 .28 .29 .26 .18 .17 .21 .31 .12 .02 .01
TAMU#Commerce .95 .76 .66 .66 .56 .43 .62 .24 .16 .19 .17 .09 .07 .12 .26 .07 .00 .00
Texas#State#U. .67 .58 .57 .48 .30 .62 .08 .05 .09 .10 .03 .00 .05 .23 .04 .00 .00
UT#Aus9n .78 .81 .64 .44 .68 .14 .09 .15 .14 .05 .01 .08 .29 .05 .00 .00
TAMU#Corpus#Chris9 .96 .87 .73 .76 .43 .28 .29 .29 .17 .10 .21 .38 .11 .00 .00
S.#Houston#State#U. .81 .66 .74 .32 .20 .26 .24 .12 .06 .15 .35 .10 .00 .00
Lamar#U. .87 .82 .56 .38 .42 .38 .23 .19 .28 .44 .16 .01 .00
UT#Arlington .86 .65 .44 .47 .41 .25 .19 .32 .48 .17 .01 .00
UT#Permian#Basin .98 .92 .90 .85 .77 .81 .81 .77 .59 .32 .20
U.#of#Houston .68 .69 .61 .41 .34 .47 .61 .26 .01 .00
Prairie#View#A&M#U. .94 .84 .63 .65 .72 .74 .39 .02 .01
TAMU#Kingsville .91 .73 .77 .81 .78 .44 .07 .03
Midwestern#State#U. .84 .91 .92 .85 .54 .11 .04
Angelo#State#U. .88 .91 .95 .63 .13 .05
UT#San#Antonio .99 .89 .51 .05 .02
U.#of#Houston#Dwtn. .90 .58 .09 .04









Table 5: Graduation and persistence differences of enrollees at Texas four-year public col-
leges. Conditioning on the full set of observable covariates.
Sample'='
Outcome'=
UT#Tyler (0.18** (0.04) (0.15** (0.04) (0.08** (0.03) (0.06 (0.03)
Texas#Women's#U. (0.10** (0.02) (0.07** (0.02) (0.02 (0.02) (0.01 (0.02)
Texas#A&M#U. (( (( (( ((
Texas#Tech#U.# (0.03** (0.01) (0.02* (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
S.#F.#AusFn#State#U. (0.10** (0.01) (0.08** (0.01) (0.08** (0.01) (0.07** (0.01)
Tarleton#State#U. (0.08** (0.02) (0.08** (0.02) (0.04** (0.01) (0.04* (0.02)
UT#Dallas (0.06** (0.02) (0.06** (0.02) (0.01 (0.01) (0.01 (0.01)
West#Texas#A&M#U. (0.14** (0.02) (0.12** (0.03) (0.07** (0.02) (0.05* (0.02)
U.#of#North#Texas (0.10** (0.01) (0.09** (0.01) (0.02** (0.01) (0.01 (0.01)
UT#Pan#American (0.11** (0.01) (0.10** (0.01) (0.06** (0.01) (0.05** (0.01)
TAMU#Galveston (0.03 (0.02) (0.02 (0.03) (0.02 (0.02) (0.00 (0.02)
TAMU#Commerce (0.12** (0.02) (0.09** (0.02) (0.03* (0.02) (0.01 (0.02)
Texas#State#U. (0.04** (0.01) (0.04** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
UT#AusFn (0.04** (0.01) (0.04** (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
TAMU#Corpus#ChrisF (0.07** (0.02) (0.05** (0.02) (0.01 (0.01) (0.00 (0.01)
S.#Houston#State#U. (0.06** (0.01) (0.05** (0.01) (0.05** (0.01) (0.04** (0.01)
Lamar#U. (0.20** (0.01) (0.18** (0.02) (0.11** (0.01) (0.08** (0.01)
UT#Arlington (0.13** (0.01) (0.12** (0.01) (0.06** (0.01) (0.06** (0.01)
UT#Permian#Basin (0.10* (0.05) (0.10* (0.05) 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03)
U.#of#Houston (0.15** (0.01) (0.13** (0.01) (0.03** (0.01) (0.03** (0.01)
Prairie#View#A&M#U. (0.08** (0.01) (0.07** (0.01) (0.01 (0.01) (0.01 (0.01)
TAMU#Kingsville (0.11** (0.02) (0.09** (0.02) (0.05** (0.01) (0.05** (0.02)
Midwestern#State#U. (0.14** (0.02) (0.12** (0.02) (0.05** (0.01) (0.05** (0.01)
Angelo#State#U. (0.15** (0.01) (0.14** (0.02) (0.08** (0.01) (0.06** (0.01)
UT#San#Antonio (0.18** (0.01) (0.17** (0.01) (0.08** (0.01) (0.07** (0.01)
U.#of#Houston#Dwtn. (0.29** (0.02) (0.28** (0.02) (0.06** (0.02) (0.04* (0.02)
Sul#Ross#State#U. (0.17** (0.03) (0.15** (0.03) (0.09** (0.02) (0.07* (0.03)
TAMU#InternaFonal (0.13** (0.02) (0.11** (0.03) (0.12** (0.02) (0.10** (0.02)
Texas#Southern#U. (0.25** (0.01) (0.24** (0.02) (0.05** (0.01) (0.05** (0.01)
UT#El#Paso (0.22** (0.02) (0.21** (0.02) (0.12** (0.02) (0.11** (0.02)
Year#FE,#H.S.#FE,#applicaFon#group#FE,#SAT#
score,#student#demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
ObservaFons 217,733 169,239 217,733 169,239
Adjusted#R2 0.20 0.19 0.10 0.10



















Table 6: Earnings differences of enrollees at Texas four-year public colleges, by high school
graduation year. Conditioning on the full set of observable covariates.
Sample'='Graduated'High'School'in:
Outcome'=
UT#Tyler 0.00 (0.26) 0.44* (0.21) 0.21 (0.19) 20.24 (0.18) 0.07 (0.12)
Texas#Women's#U. 20.01 (0.14) 20.04 (0.13) 20.16 (0.12) 0.06 (0.10) 0.01 (0.12)
Texas#A&M#U. 22 22 22 22 22
Texas#Tech#U.# 0.05 (0.07) 20.02 (0.06) 20.09 (0.06) 20.01 (0.07) 0.02 (0.06)
S.#F.#AusGn#State#U. 0.01 (0.08) 20.04 (0.08) 20.09 (0.07) 20.06 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07)
Tarleton#State#U. 20.02 (0.13) 20.06 (0.11) 0.05 (0.09) 20.10 (0.11) 20.02 (0.14)
UT#Dallas 20.17 (0.12) 0.03 (0.15) 0.06 (0.08) 20.02 (0.10) 20.08 (0.11)
West#Texas#A&M#U. 0.05 (0.17) 0.16 (0.12) 20.22 (0.14) 20.30 (0.20) 20.02 (0.14)
U.#of#North#Texas 20.05 (0.08) 0.05 (0.07) 20.03 (0.06) 20.12 (0.07) 20.09 (0.07)
UT#Pan#American 20.19* (0.09) 0.04 (0.08) 20.02 (0.08) 20.11 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08)
TAMU#Galveston 20.28 (0.20) 20.25 (0.16) 20.02 (0.17) 20.06 (0.14) 0.12 (0.14)
TAMU#Commerce 0.03 (0.16) 20.16 (0.10) 20.04 (0.11) 20.03 (0.11) 20.13 (0.12)
Texas#State#U. 20.08 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07) 20.06 (0.06) 20.14* (0.06) 20.07 (0.06)
UT#AusGn 20.06 (0.07) 20.02 (0.05) 20.07 (0.05) 20.08 (0.06) 20.09 (0.05)
TAMU#Corpus#ChirisG 20.12 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09) 20.10 (0.09) 20.17 (0.10) 20.08 (0.09)
S.#Houston#State#U. 20.06 (0.08) 20.11 (0.09) 20.02 (0.07) 20.06 (0.08) 20.17* (0.08)
Lamar#U. 0.01 (0.10) 20.16 (0.10) 20.11 (0.10) 20.04 (0.10) 20.06 (0.09)
UT#Arlington 20.23* (0.11) 20.02 (0.10) 20.03 (0.07) 20.11 (0.08) 20.12 (0.07)
UT#Permian#Basin 20.15 (0.18) 20.02 (0.24) 20.21 (0.27) 20.61 (0.34) 20.10 (0.22)
U.#of#Houston 20.16 (0.08) 20.12 (0.07) 20.19** (0.06) 20.04 (0.07) 20.13 (0.07)
Prairie#View#A&M#U. 0.03 (0.13) 20.30* (0.14) 20.19** (0.07) 20.15 (0.08) 20.08 (0.08)
TAMU#Kingsville 20.15 (0.09) 20.17 (0.12) 20.14 (0.10) 20.24* (0.11) 20.12 (0.09)
Midwestern#State#U. 20.24 (0.16) 20.07 (0.11) 20.06 (0.10) 20.19 (0.12) 20.24* (0.11)
Angelo#State#U. 20.39** (0.12) 20.05 (0.08) 20.33** (0.11) 0.11 (0.11) 20.07 (0.10)
UT#San#Antonio 20.14 (0.07) 20.12 (0.07) 20.26** (0.07) 20.12 (0.07) 20.16** (0.06)
U.#of#Houston#Dwtn. 20.14 (0.11) 20.09 (0.09) 20.21* (0.10) 20.17 (0.10) 20.23 (0.12)
Sul#Ross#State#U. 20.14 (0.18) 20.32 (0.24) 20.36 (0.23) 0.05 (0.16) 20.18 (0.23)
TAMU#InternaGonal 20.12 (0.12) 20.11 (0.20) 0.01 (0.15) 0.03 (0.17) 20.42** (0.13)
Texas#Southern#U. 20.14 (0.10) 20.47** (0.15) 20.26* (0.11) 20.32** (0.11) 20.22* (0.10)
UT#El#Paso 20.24* (0.12) 20.28* (0.13) 20.39** (0.12) 20.35** (0.13) 20.34* (0.15)
Year#FE,#H.S.#FE,#applicaGon#group#
FE,#SAT#score,#student#demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ObservaGons 31,442 32,003 34,244 34,774 36,776






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UT#Aus'n Research#University#(very#high) 47,439 20.4 $9,312 no
TAMU Research#University#(very#high) 39,517 20.8 $8,636 no
UT#Dallas Research#University#(high) 11,928 29.1 $6,435 no
Texas#Tech#U. Research#University#(high) 27,353 27.2 $5,484 no
UT#El#Paso Research#University#(high) 14,618 23.9 $4,963 yes
U.#of#North#Texas Research#University#(high) 26,730 32.4 $4,885 no
UT#Arlington Research#University#(high) 20,430 27.8 $4,722 no
U.#of#Houston Research#University#(high) 56,149 50.5 $2,806 no
TAMU#Kingsville Doctoral/Research#University 5,967 28.3 $5,444 no
Texas#Woman's#U. Doctoral/Research#University 8,973 23.6 $5,282 no
TAMU#Commerce Doctoral/Research#University 7,275 26.3 $4,357 no
Sul#Ross#State#U. Master's#University 2,455 20.8 $5,064 yes
UT#Tyler Master's#University 4,284 20.7 $4,761 no
TAMU#Corpus#Chris' Master's#University 7,153 31.5 $4,680 no
Lamar#U. Master's#University 8,963 26.2 $4,626 no
S.#F.#Aus'n#State#U. Master's#University 10,591 25.4 $4,250 no
UT#Pan#American Master's#University 15,007 27.6 $4,239 yes
UT#San#Antonio Master's#University 21,277 28.8 $4,115 no
West#Texas#A&M#U. Master's#University 6,148 26.8 $4,039 no
Tarleton#State#U. Master's#University 7,734 27.2 $3,983 no
Prairie#View#A&M#U. Master's#University 10,297 30.8 $3,146 no
S.#Houston#State#U. Master's#University 13,090 33.6 $3,119 no
Texas#Southern#U. Master's#University 5,878 16.4 $8,102 yes
TAMU#Interna'onal Master's#University 3,377 20.3 $5,787 no
Angelo#State#U. Master's#University 5,558 25.7 $5,225 no
Midwestern#State#U. Master's#University 5,369 25.0 $4,137 no
UT#Permian#Basin Master's#University 2,576 24.3 $3,819 no
TAMU#Galveston Baccalaureate#College 1,559 18.8 $5,776 no
U.#of#Houston#Dwtn. Baccalaureate#College 8,456 34.4 $3,291 yes
Notes:
(1)#Data#source:#Integrated#Postsecondary#Educa'on#Data#System#(IPEDS).#All#data#is#from#the#2004#academic#year.
(2)#TAMU#=#Texas#A&M#University.##UT#=#University#of#Texas.
Ins-tu-on
28
